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The Labour Relations Act of 1995, hailed as an achievement to 
rank in importance alongside the Industrial Conciliation. Act 
of 1924, remains the legal punchbag of the nineties. 
Despite its hurricane passage through NEDLAC and Parliament, 
the criticism generated by its predecessor (the Draft Bill) 
remains for the most part unanswered. It would appear that the 
drafter·s optimism, epitomised by the kind fashionable, 
rhetoric that has become equally synonymous with this the age 
of co-operation and reconstruction, will have to suffice. 1 
\At the hear·t of the debate lies the complex issue 
collective bargaining. In one brief instant the drafters 
believed they had seen the future, most notably the direction 
labour/management relations] 
is clearly reflected in virtually the entire 






Arbitration will hold centre stage, whilst 
the main body of bargaining legislation 
rights, collective agreements, workplace 
forums, statutory and bargaining councils, and the new 
to strike) are complied with. Here the drafters hope 
right 
the 
interconnecting system of checks and balances will promote a 
new kind of industrial order. 
This dissertation will foccis almost exclusively on those areas 
of the A.ct dealing with collective bargaining, with particular 
emphasis on the lack of a bargaining duty _ and the 
controversial adoption of the centralised bargaining mo4el. 
By way of introduction it is necessary to briefly contrast the 
old (Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956) with the new (Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995). 
1 A number of thQ Acta prov�s�ons are a1raady �n £ores. Saa 




2. THE PAST <ACT 28 OF 1956) AND THE FUTURE <ACT 66 OF 19952 
The current dispensation is marked by a two-tiered bargaining 
structure. Unions and employers have the option of voluntarily 
coming together in Industrial Councils to negotiate industry -
wide agreements on wages and working conditions. Furthermore 
by means of the unfair labour practice remedy, unions can 
compel reluctant employers to bargain with them at factory and 
sometimes industry level. 2 These declaratory orders may be 
applied for by any party. 3 
The Act proposes an entirely new arrangement. Gone is the 
unfair labour practice concept and with it all notions of a 
duty to bargain. Instead, the A~t·s declared intention is to 
"unashamedly promote collective bargaining _via a set of 
organizational rights and the new right to strike. 
At the core of the new 
procedure. Unlike the old 
order is a revamped recognition 
system driven by the unfair labour 
practice provisions, the new Act provides that henceforth an 
employer will only be obliged to accord rights of recognition 
to representative unions. 4 Despite the lack of a definition 
as to what constitutes "sufficiently representative", tµe 
context plainly shows that only unions with a significant 
membership base, albeit short of a majority will pass 
muster. 5 
At plant level the organisational rights provided by the Act 
will give statutory force to union entitlements once 
2 Thompson C. "Labour Laws Th:1.rd Revolut:1.on" Weekly Mail and 
Guard:1.an. February 3-9. 1996 at 10 
3 Lae:ob.Z. "Memorandum on the Draft LE<.bour Rel.s.t:1.ons B:1.ll." De 
Rebus. ,June 1996 at 368. 
4 Cheadle, Thompson. Van N:1.ekerk and Le Roux " CUr·r·ent Labour Law 
1996" at 30 
6 Op C:1.t Note lat 34 
3 
restricted to recognition agreements.s 
A union deemed" sufficiently representative "may claim three 
classes of rights, amongst other access to employer's 
premises, stop-order facilities and the right to reasonable 
leave during working hours to perform union functions.? 
In order to compensate for the lack of a bargaining duty, 
union effectiveness is bolste~ed by the inclusion of section 
16(2) and (3). The disclosure provisions will force employers 
to divulge all relevant information to union representatives 
that will allow them to perform their functions properly, 
whilst engaging 
consultation. 
in effective collective bargaining and 
Trade unions might even demand additional organizational 
rights and include these in collective agreements.a 
Combined with these organizational rights is a right to strike 
to extract employer recognition, the ultimate aim of the 
drafters being to replace legal compuls1on by compulsion via 
an exercise of power or threat thereof. Failure to bargain 
with a union which has organizational rights could lead to 
strike action once the Act·s conciliation measures have been 
exhausted.8 
The new role of the courts in terms of the proposed 
legislation will be to guard those existing rights already 
provided for. No longer will the courts be able to force 
collective bargaining, though the Act proposes that all 
' 6 Employment Law. September 1996. Vol 12. N 1 at 2 
7 Op Cit Note lat 33 
8 Ben..1.runin p " The Naw Labour Relations Bill " South Afrie:an Labcur 
Bulletin. Vol 19. N l. March 1995 at 17.and aee section 20.Labour 
Relations Act 1996. 
9 Jorda.sn B " The duty to bargain undar the dr·aft L.R.A. " Labo1;1r 
Law News and Court Reports. Vol B. 1995. see section 64 Labo1.u~ 
Relations Act 1996. 
4 
disputes regarding recognition/derecognition of trade unions 
must go to advisory arbitration before industrial action can 
be undertaken. 10 This should increase pressure on employers 
to recognise unions for collective bargaining purposes before 
industrial action becomes the only viable alternative. 
By taking the courts out of the bargaining system the drafters 
have made the threat of industrial action the ultimate option 
in cases in which the employer refuses to recognise a union as 
a collective bargaining agent, or withdraws from a collective 
bargaining relationship, or 
of appropriate bargaining 
conduct 
where a dispute exists in respect 
units/subjects. Ii1cases of mala 
no court will have the power to fides 
decide 
bargaining 
whether such conduct constitutes an unfair labour 
practice. 11 
The new position will thereafter be quite similar to the old. 
Collective agreements which would override individual 
contracts may be concluded by parties to a statutory or 
bargaining council, and also by a union and employer at 
workplace or enterprise level. 1 2 
Furthermore all collective agreements must make provision for 
the resolution of disputes, via conciliation and if needs be 
arbitration.(s24.l) 
What follows is a critical assessment of the reasons behind 
the proposed legislation; why did the drafters decide to 
follow this particular route? 
1.0 Op Cit Note .3 
1J. OJ.ivier t1. A New Labour ReJ.ations Act. Eesentia.1 
characteristics and imp1ications for the Profession " . De Rebus ,J'l.lne 
1996 at 369. 
12 Op Cit Note .1 
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3. RATIONAL FOR CHANGE - PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
3.1 CORPORATISM 
Despite the explanatory provisions that accompanied the Bill, 
the drafter's policy choice shourd be seen for what it really 
is, the !)8W" high water mark" of corporatism. C9rporatism is 
the collective sentiment of the drafting team.1 3 
From the one-time controversial alliance between labour and 
business that highlighted the beginning of the" New Age "in 
South African history (an age that will best be remembered for 
the vast political changes) the drafters intend to create a 
new self-enforcing cooperative relationship to tackle the 
future. 14 
Fuelling the corporatist engine is the so-called New Ethos, 
Minister Mboweni's catch-all phrase representing the need for 
an understanding to be reached between unions and business 
that in order to be both competitive and successful, they will 
have to sit down and jointly work things out.i 5 
Despite the attractiveness of 
abound. 
the proposition, problems 
"Corporatism flows from a shared vision, it does not create a 
shared vision. "16 
Where corporatism has worked elsewhere there usually has been 
a strong consensus on economic objectives. In social 
democracies ( Sweden) there has tended to•be consensus on the 
need to create and sustain jobs, with the community bearing 
the cost for social services. 
Op cit note .l. 
1 4 See" NEDLAC ... Gol.den tria.ngl.e on tr:1.al." F:1.nancial. Ma:1.l. Jul.y 7 
l.995 at 24 
15 tfuoweni T " The rol.a of tha tr·ada union movement in tha future 
South Africa" South African Labour Bul.letin .Vol l.6. No 8. Nov/Dec l.992 
l. 6 Parsons R 
l.995. at 22 
" Gel.den Triangl.e on trial. " Financial. t1ail. July 7. 
6 
It is all to clear that the Act cannot be described as the 
product of a shared vision. The original draft was described 
as having anticipated the very process it should have 
commenced with, in that instead of commencing with an open 
ended commission of enquiry, representative of both the major 
stakeholders and headed by a cross section of experts, the 
minister began, fatally, the other way round.17 
Furthe1·more neither COSATU nor Business S.A (NEDLAC partners) 
can claim to be a " globular monolith", 1"ep1•esentative of a 
majority interest, and capable of speaking with a single voi_ce 
on the ma._1or issues of the day, although it would appear that 
if Anglo and the Congress of South African Trade Unions can 
come to an understanding their conception of the public 
inte:rest prevails . .1..a 
Emerging from a strife torn industrial relations past it is 
hard to understand the apparent ease with which the drafters 
accepted the notion of labour and business overcoming 
suspicions as to motives and fears of exploitation whilst· 
willingly engaging in a candid exchange of views and 
information. The" miracle" of the general election no doubt 
eased the way - if the politicians could get it right the 
first time round then labour and business can do the same. 
It is suggested that although there is no single voice of the 
people in politics, large representative groupings, sharing 
substantially similar opinions are still easily identifiable. 
The same does not hold true for the discrepancies that exist 
in the industrial and economic domain; in a deeply divided and 
economically competitive society there is little hope of 
unanimity of opinion, not only between labour and business but 
1? Leon T " Bil.l. ignores key social. and economic pl.ayers 
Business D,ay 23.6.95 & see Brand and Brassey " .Jumping the gun: pr·cbl.ema 
in the drafting of the new L.R.A" South African Labour Bul.l.etin. Vol. 1.9 No 
2 
1.8 Op cit note .l. 
7 
also amongst labour and business itself. 
Only recently, Sam Shilowa pointed to the" state of false 
consensus on economic issues" which South Africans are still 
labouring under.is 
Addressing a multi-national business congress he alluded to 
the fact that not only were labour and business still working 
against each other, but more importantly, while government, 
organised labour and business agreed on the need for· sustained 
economic growth, global competitiveness and redressing the 
apartheid imbalances, they differed substantially on how this 
should happen7 "the reality is that we have yet to agree on a 
growth strategy as a country." 
Furthermore, the political leadership that guided South Africa 
into the new era were truly representative of their 
constituencies. Despite Cosatu's apparent popularity the 
federation is by no means the united body it once was. The 
response to the Bill by the more militant members (see Wits 
regional shopsteward council) underlies the growing 
differences within the organisation. 
To argue that either business or labour are now suddenly 
their respective positions would not 
self inte1,est nature of collective 
prepared to compromise 
only be to ignore the 
bargaining which revolves around maximisation of power~ but 
also some seventy yea1·s of industrial history. 20 
The juggling of bargaining levels by both labour and business 
during this period was nothing more than an attempt by both 
parties to grab at the strongest position possible. Whilst 
militant black unions struggled for recognition at plant 
level, employers were content to deal at central level with" 
19 Na.sh S " Shi1owa. r-c:i.ff1as SACOB~a feather-a " Tha Ca.pa Timas. 
Oc:tobar• 1995 
20 Da Vil.liar-a I " Col.1ec:tiva Bar-gaining. DGtr·egul.&i.tion and Damocr-a.cy . 
" Pr-oc:aadings of tha l.a.bour- 1aw Confar-anc:e l.99E>. 
8 
tame unions" and labour bureaucrats The decision by 
bargaining in the 
reality and drove 
structure. Only 
"Cosatu~s call for 
Cosatu to vigorously pursue centralised 
eighties made industry wide strikes a 
employers to call for a more decentralised 
the recent NEDLAC compromise has" dulled 
a compulsory centralised bargaining structure. Even so it 
would be unwise to suggest COSATU have put away their arms on 
this issue2 1 ; NEDLAC should be seen more as a compromise 
then a consensus. It would appear that the ver.v na tu.re of 
collective bargaining excludes neut1'ali ty. 
Such entrenched positions are merely a reflection of the self 
interest nature of collective bargaining and prove to show the 
new ethos in this particular ar•ea anyway, to be illusionary 
at best. 
Just how the drafters envisage the new process taking off 
remains to be seen. The absolute reliance on voluntarism, 
however, makes for hard digestion. 
On the up-side many large firms have already, of their own 
initiative, gone way beyond the reco1mnendations in the Act. 
Important exceptions, perhaps. Minister Mboweni believes 
they demonstrate that the apartheid workplace can be 
transformed in line with the overall democratisation of 
society. 22 
Given the nature of the Act~s bargaining provisions and the 
I 
limitation of workplace forums to industries with a required 
work~r/ threshold it would appear that the 
which might conform to tne minieter s vision 
only workp.1.aces 
are the large 
ones. 
21 Ray t1 & Toerien 11 " Unions on the outside J.ooking in " The 
Shopateward. August/September l.996 at l.6. 
22 Mboweni T " A foundation for labour rel.ati.ons in the 21st Century 
"Appropriation Bil.l.: National. Asaembl.y. 22 June l.996 
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4. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - A NEW APPROACH . l 
4.1 PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
Whilst accepting that an underlying commitment to corporatism 
has shaped the overall structure of the Bill, the collective 
bargaining provisions are best examined by reflecting on the 
state of our cur~ent bargaining institutions. 
The apartheid labour market policies were supported by an 
industrial relations system 
collective bargaining and 
trade unions. Black workers 
that provided for centralised 
organizational rights for white 
were, until 1979, excluded from 
the system. The present structures of bargaining are inherited 
from the dualism spawned by the exclusion of black workers 
from the industrial council system and the breakdown of that 
system. 
Excluding black workers from the Act had two effects. Firstly, 
the trade unions organising black workers developed a system 
of collective bargaining outside the formal system, namely at 
the level of the workplace in the form of recognition 
agreements. It was here that the spartan nature of the unions 
initiated the development of the duty to bargain. Secondly, 
the racially exclusive trade unions that participated in 
industrial councils tended to organise around skill and 
occupational grades.23 
These distortions are reproduced in the structures of 
bargaining craft trade unions still sit on industrial 
councils with representation out of all proportion to their 
membership; industrial trade unions have tended to be 
recognised in respect of manual workers only; the diffusion of 
the recognition strategy of the black trade union movement has 
led to a proliferation of bargaining units based on 
occupational criteria; many of the industrial councils no 
23 Op Cit Note 22 
longer reflect 
modern economy; 
cover more than 
industry, others 
adding to this 
10 
the nature of the division 
industrial councils have been 
of sectors in a 
established that 
one industry, some that apply to a part of an 






at levels even 
bargaining by recognising 
smaller than the single 
The Bill suggested further factors that influenced the 
drafters in adopting the new collective bargaining strategy. 
The fundamental problem with the old law (Act 28 of 1956) 
governing labour relations was the lack of conceptual- clarity 
as to the structure and functions of collective bargaining. 
The industrial court, under a very wide discretion given to it 
by the definition of the unfair labour practice, developed a 
jurisprudence all of it's own, the results of which can be 
seen in the haphazard manner in which the court adjudicated" 
similar type " disputes. The development of a duty to bargain 
at plant level (in certain instance's this was extended to 
industrial level disputes) created as much shadow as light in 
this not9riously 'uncertain domain of labour law. Despite 
unanimous agreement that such a duty did exist, the courts 
persistently held that it was not their task to determine its 
outcome. 
What was particularly disturbing about this jurisprudence was 
the court's determination of bargaining units. Although the 
broad thrust of collective bargaining centred around the 
single employer or the plant, the industrial court saw fit to 
define bargaining units on grounds of race, and often took the 
somewhat idiosyncratic view that even individual workers had 
the right to bargain collectively; the' one man one bargaining 
unit , approach. 
24 O:i:;, Cit Nota 22 
11 
Since the right to bargain in South Africa was not tied to 
majoritarianism, situations arose whereby smaller unions, many 
of which were totally incapable of bargaining effectively, 
where granted bargaining rights commensurate with their larger 
counterparts. This allowed employers to circumvent meaningful 
bargaining by protracted discussions and separate conditions 
being afforded to different recognition agreements. 
Cosatu and its affiliates do not like this as decentralisation 
weakens their power base.25 
Furthermore, uncertainty has long prevailed over when parties 
can legitimately disengage from· the process and resort to 
economic muscle. The court's intrusion into the bargaining 
arena by pronouncing on the nature and conduct of parties to 
negotiations only accentuated this uncertainty. By declaring 
on premature resort to industrial action the court could have 
unknowingly prolonged so-called ·· sham bargaining " in the 
form of getting good faith bargaining back on track. 
The results of these developments led the drafting team to 
conclude that the existing statutory framework was unable to 
properly accommodate or 
between bargaining at the 
of the workplace. 
4.2 BARGAINING MODELS 
facilitate an orderly relationship 
level of industry and at the level 
In their deliberations on a revised collective bargaining 
strategy the task team gave consideration to three competing 
models. Firstly, a system of statutory compulsion in which the 
duty to bargain is underpinned by a statutory determination of 
the levels at which bargaining should take place and the 
issues over which parties are compelled to bargain. 
The second model was described as being not entirely 
2 5 Benjamin p " Reforming Labour- . _ _ 1.;;.eeons fr-om the lJ. S. A " South 
African Labour Bulletin. Vol. 19. n 2. May 1995 
12 
dissimila~ from the first, by relying on judicial intervention 
to determine the appropriate levels and subjects of bargaining 




The final model, unanimously adopted by the drafters, allows 
the parties through the exercise of economic power to 
determine their own arrangements. This exercise of power is 
furthermore given statutory impetus by the 
organizational rights and the right to strike. 
provision of 
T-he task team argued that in a changing economic environment 
it is best to leave bargaining ( including the level at which 
this takes place and the identity of the parties to collective 
bargaining) to the parties themselves to sort out, without 
imposing a statutory duty on them to do so. 
As a result the~most notable feature-·-orthe Act is the absenc..e. 
·----------------------------,----
of a statutory duty to bargain. 
The corporatist model gives the workers, on whom the ANG-led 
government relies significantly for support, the greatest say 
in their working lives. It is, probably the only means by 
which a bridge can readily be built between the races in the 
workplace.26 
4.3 THE DUTY OT BARGAIN 
PROBLEMS WITH A LEGISLATED DUTY TO BARGAIN 
In the debates that preceded the drawing up of the draft Bill 
the task team noted that until the enactment of the unfair 
labour practice definition in 1979, collective bargaifing 
structures were voluntarist in the sense that whilst the 1law 
encouraged collective bargaining on an industry wide scale, no 
party could be compelled to bargain other than by means of 
exercise of economic power. During the 1980~s the court, 
26 Braasey 11 & Brand J " Fla.wa and Fantasies - a conceptual ana.lyaia 
of the Bill." Empl.oyment Law. March l.995. Vol. l.l.. N 4 
13 
acting in terms of provisions designed ostensibly to protect 
individual rights, assumed jurisdiction to intervene in 
collective disputes, via the creation of a duty to bargain. 
In their attempts to by-pass the statutory compulsion model 
the drafters pointed to the problems inherent in that system. 
One of the primary concerns of statutory compulsion is the 
rigidity that it introduces and the assumption that there is a 
right answer to appropriate levels of bargaining and 
bargaining topics. 




terms this means state regulations and collective 
agreements exist which regulate the buying and 
labour power, and it's use within the capitalist 
labour process.27 
That regulation may produce rigidities goes without saying, 
not so the fact that rigidities are always undesirable. The 
true question, never satisfactory answered by the drafters, is 
whether the cost of these rigidities is justified by the 
attendant benefits to the system. The drafters also failed to 
consider the legal mechanisms which could be set in place to 
minimise rigidity. John Appollis believes that whilst 
regulations do exist, which place some obstacles in the path 
of the employer, they are in most cases very inadequate. 
Whilst it is possible to set clear guidelines regarding unfair 
dismissal in certain instances, it remains controversial 
whether the same can be done for the duty to bargain. - It was 
suggested that the duty to bargain could be defined in some 
deta-il in statute, which in turn could be developed by a 
legitimate labour court. The question then becomes one of 
substance, what exactly would go into the statute? 
2 7 Appol.l.is .:J ,,. ThEI r,e.;r L.&.bour- REll.ations Bil.l. and e:Gontr-a.l.ised 
bargaining" South Af:r-ican Labou:r- Bul.l.etin. Vol. l.9 No 2. May l.995 
14 
The varied nature of our previous collective bargaining 
system, with its range of bargaining units and levels, the co-
existence of the all-comers and majoritarian approaches 
coupled with political divisions between unions would 
certainly have complieated the task. 
Such injudicious guidelines could have set South 'Africa on a 
similar course to that of the United Kingdom where the 
legislated duty to bargain was such a failure that it~s repeal 
in 1980 encountered little opposition. 2 8 
What the drafters also feared was that, under a system by 
which the structure of bargaining is regulated eeonomic 
outcomes could be imposed upon parties which often bear 
little, if any, relation to the needs of the parties or the 
power they are capable of exercising. Objections like this are 
easy to refute in that, under a reg'ulated bargaining structure 
economic outcomes cannot be imposed upon parties as their 
obligation is to negotiate and not to arrive at any specific 
outcome. The old adage, the duty to bargain does not entail a 
concurrent duty to agree, holds true to dispel such concerns. 
The objection tends to hide the more important issue of the 
type of structur·e within which parties bargain and the obvious 
influence it can have not only on tl1e specific substantive 
outcomes but also on the effect of such 2'utcomes. 
Clearly, agreements reached at industry level have the 
~otential to effect a wide range of oma~-3:-e~-'-----3:.~<lustries, 
despite the fact that they are seldom very specific, whilst 
••--• ~ ••-•-•• -•- ~ w--•~-~ --- •-• 
plant level bargaining is tailored to suit the needs of a 
-·-----
specific industry and migl1t--nof- be as effective as centralised 
bargaining in obtaining radical changes. The drafters have 
_/________ ·- ··•------------- ------------
endeavoured to ensure that across the board industry 
bargaining be aimed at getting business and labour to forge 
28 Benje.min p and Cooper- C" Responding to tha Labour- Relations Bill 
" _Industrial Law Jour-n.s.1 Vol 16. part 2 1995 
15 
consensus on the larger issues facing the country, rather than 
a vehicle for securing sector-wide agreements on minimum wages 
---~·-·-"---· - ~---·~ ---
and working conditions. The overall message is that whilst 
------= 
promoting centralised bargaining, decentralisation must be 
--••"---• ·---
al lowed if bargaining is more effective at plant level. 
The second difficulty is legal. Who owes the duty to 
bargain?2 9 
How is the law to effectively compel employers, organised and 
unorganised to bargain collectively at industry and central 
level? Many believe the courts are incapable of enforcing a 
duty to bargain at industry level because that would involve 
forcing rival employers to bargain jointly. This 
interpretation is, however, questioned by some who believe 
that, based on past experience, there is little evidence that 
such an imbalance would occur, in particular given the court>s 
recent reluctance to interfere in prescribing levels of 
bargaining_30 
How are employers to be identified and how are agreements 
going to be reached? 
If it is legally difficult, if not impossible, to compel the 
establishment of bargaining structures and processes at 
industry level then giving the courts a general discretion to 
impose a duty to bargain will have a decentralising effect, 
and government supports industry bargaining. 
Addressing the National Assembly during the June Budget Vote, 
Minister Mboweni pointed out that, 31 
29 Du Toit and Bosch " Size doaa Cot.int " Waakly Mail. 2 
March 1995. The Authors have argued that r-al.ianca on this point b"!,-• 
the task team ia unconvincing. 
se saa BAUJ .,,. Timas t1Godia [unrapor-tad J in Thompson C " DL1ty to 
Barga.in Ra-examined" Employment Law 1993 
31 Op cit note 18 
16 
the natural home of the statutory duty to bargain 
that identifies the collectively is in a labour market policy 
single employer 
bargaining." 
as the primary 
4.4 RESPONSES TO THE NEW APPROACH 
site for collective 
The lack of compulsory centralised bargaining is in line with 
the Nee-liberal capitarist approach to industrial 
relations.32 
Despite the obvious necessity for increased productivity and 
competitiveness, by making it one of the pivotal structures 
for the foundations of the bargaining dispensation, the draft 
team attracted widespread union criticism. For them the 
objectives of the Act merely provide space and effect for the 
dictates of capitalist accumulation via a capitalist law of 
the jungle approach. The exaggeration of the dualist nature of 
bargaining could see the 30%/ 70% divide in the workplace 
become reality. This, according to the unions, will only 
perpetuate the growing wage differential with only a few elite 
workers receiving substantial salaries. 
It should be borne in mind that the duty to bargain was 
pronounced upon by the industrial court in the mid-1980's at a 
time when there was uncertainty over many issues which we 
today take for granted. One can well recall the days when 
employers engaged in debate about the necessity of even 
recognising trade unions. "Much water has passed under the 
bridge since.then. "33 
Although the Industrial court's pronouncements in relation to 
32 Appol.1.ia J " " South Afr·ican Labour- Bul.1.etin. Vol. 1.9. n z. t1.ay 
1.996 
33 Op cit note 2. 
17 
.the duty to bargain may have been confused, this should not be 
surprising. Its pronouncements in many instances depended upon 
the specific factual nature of the case at hand. 
Furthermore, there tends to be a gap in relation 
binding effect of industrial law judgments. Courts 
to the 
dealing 
to act with labour law regard themselves as free 
independently. As a result there has always been uncertainty 
about the precedental value of industrial court decisio~s. 
Notwithstanding all the problems referred to above, certain 
broad and consistent approaches in the application by the 
courts of the duty to bargain did emerge. This tended to 
encourage bargaining between employers and representative 
employees, whilst at the same time facilitating dispute 
resolution and thereby avoiding unnecessary industrial action. 
Crucially, the new Act has attempted to by-pass these problems 
by the process of codification. 
The task team believed the problem of establishing limits 
bargaining levels, units, agents and topics to be the 
central cause for the rejection of the statutory compulsion 
model. There arguments are hard to justify if one considers 
that the goal of the Act is to achieve a separat.ion between 
the struggle for wages and working conditions on the one hand 
and the actual business of production on the other. Only 
industrial action whereby workers demand bargaining or the 
changing of the material results of bargaining will be deemed 
procedural. Issues involving the actual business of production 
(the way the company operates), restructuring and productivity 
will, the Act hopes, become matters for co-dete~mination. This 
effectively means that strikes over what are currently known 
as rights disputes, (or what , the Act calls justiciable 
disputes) are no longer permissible or protected. The Act 
provides for numerous justiciable disputes, including disputes 
concerning freedom of association, matters of 
decision making by workplace forums, 





action, severance pay, and workplace 
In a sense then, the Act has already 
bargaining subjects/topics and limited 
accordingly. 
drawn a framework for 
the right to strike 
Given that the duty to bargain does not entail a corresponding 
duty to .agree, it would seem that a legally enforceable 
bargaining provision could only be of use to those unions that 
are powerful enough to force employers to make meaningful 
changes. Unions that are unable to force collective bargaining 
will not be able to force employers to offer the type of 
improvements in wages and working conditions that their 
workers want. Benjamin points to the United States example, 
where only one-third of the unions that are recognised 
actually go on to achieve first agreements. Basically, the 
duty to bargain cannot guarantee either effective bargaining 
or a fair agreement, so why have it? 
Benjamin~s argument seems logical enough, but one needs to 
question the assumption that weaker unions who are unable to 
make inroads into managerial decision making will not benefit 
from a bargaining duty. 
Indeed, the opposite seems true. Those powerful unions that 
are able to force employer cooperation on worker demands will 
not require such a duty as existing relationships will 
probably continue to exist, and where not, the protection 
given to workers striking over distributive matters means that 
worker·s will probably be able to force the issue. 
However, in order to foster negotiations at small and medium 
enterprise level a bargaining obligation acquires renewed 
impetus, particularly since it is at this level that 
34 Empl.oymant Law. Sapte.mbar 1996. Vol. 12. N 1. 
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labour law exists for the most part as a,dead letter." 
So, the critics say, now that there is no longer a need for 
industrial action on the right to negotiate workers will 
merely strike on the material outcome of bargaining! 
Is there a difference? In light of both the aims of the draft 
Bill and the constant reference by the Labour Ministry to the 
creation of a New Ethos, and given that the workplace forums 
provisions exclude the lions share of the economy it is 
suggested that the difference is quiet substantial. If the 
idea is for increased productivity via greater worker / 
management co-operation then it seems obvious that the greater 
the ambit of negotiating forums and topics the better.s5 
4.5 POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW APPROACH 
Despite the drafter~s resistance to the statutory compulsion 
model it remains government policy to promote collective 
bargaining at industry level. 36 
In order to give effect to this policy, the question of 
statutory 
debate. Is 
compulsion inevitably becomes a central 
it entirely feasible to attempt to 
topic of 
promote 
collective bargaining without a legally enforced bargaining 
duty; the more so in a country in which labour/management 
relations are undemocratic and authoritarian?37 
35 Note that the Dunl.op commission in the United States concluded 
that ther-e ia overwhelming. evidence th.s.t empl.oyea participation and 
l.abour management cooperation are good for workers, firms and the national 
economy. The Twenty First Century Workplace requires greater participation 
and cooperation." These views are eimil.ar to those e:,..."Pressed in the 
explanatory memorandum in the draft bil.l.. 
36 Mboweni T " A foundation for Labour· Rel.ationa in the 21st cant'l.lry 
"Appropriation Bil.l.: National. Aaaembl.y. Budget Vote 22 June l.996 
37 t1boweni T " A Foundation For Labour Relations In The 21st. 
Cantury " Appropriation Bil.1: National. Assembly 22 ,June- l.995. 
* the Minister described the position a.a .•• " in the factories, the 
farms • thia hotial.s, the mines and in the officas, apartheid :is al.ii;ria and 
well •.• " 
Having recogn:ieed this- l.a.ck of transition -thia drafters w:iliingness to 
embracia a vol.untariat, co-operative model. ie puzzl.:ing. 
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The question confronting unions now (probably only smaller 
unions) is not what improvements will result from the division 
of the fruits of labour, but whether there will be bargaining 
in the first place. 
Employers could willy-nilly pull out of existing bargaining 
relationships or point blank refuse to bargain with a 
representative union. Notwithstanding the ANC's and the Bill's 
stated commitment to protecting existing bargaining 
arrangements, it is conceivable that employers could compel 
unions to fight a new struggle every year to secure bargaining 
relations. Such uncertainty and insecurity within the 
collective bargaining arena gives employers a powerful 
instrument with which to enforce worker compliance. This, 
according to Appollis is the way the Act hopes to ensure that 
the South African economy adapts to the requirements of world 
capitalist competition by eliminating so-called rigidities. 
Another possible result of the absence of a duty to bargain is 
that disputes will become issues of interest and this will 
lead to increased industrial unrest. 38 More importantly, 
this will mean that many weaker and smaller unions will not be 
able to gain recognition and collective bargaining as their 
members will not be able to win these trials of strength. As 
has already been mentioned, unions that might have secured 
bargaining agreements previously could find themselves 
fighting entirely new recognition disputes. 
As the recent SPAR dispute so aptly illustrates, a resort to 
power on matters of structure seldom provides a union or 
employer with clear-cut gains.s9 
Spar workers, acting through their unions demanded a 
38 Ben,1 am.in p " Re for-ming La.bo'l.lr- . . • . • . J.asaona fr-om tha U. B. A " 
Bo'l.lth Afr-ican Labour- B'l.lJ.J.etin. Vol. J.9 n 2. May J.995 
39 Br-and J. Br-asaey t1. " Comments on tha Dr-a.ft Nagotiating Document 
in BiJ.J. For-m ( The New Labour- ReJ.ations Act) 
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centralised system of bargaining in which a standard set of 
te1'ms of employment could be fixed. Spar employers, speaking 
through their franchiser, preferred bargaining to be at shop 
level so that terms of employment could be fixed locally. 
Following months of wrangling the workers went on a strike 
that lasted many violence-marred weeks. Employers countered by 
dismissing some two thousand workers and the strike collapsed. 
More importantly, from the action the workers won nothing for 
themselves, so the goal of upliftment was frustrated; 
effective collective bargaining within the company remains 
non-existent so levels of frustration are intense. Despite the 
extent of loss suffered by both parties during the dispute no 
effective outcome was reached. Stalemates like this do little 
to enhance the credibility of the new legislation which 
suggests that such displays could become commonplace. Clearly, 
what the drafters hoped to achieve is a situation in which 
both parties recognise the importance of the relationship that 
has to exist between them if they are to survive; whether the 
parties are mature enough to abide by the new rules remains to 
be seen. 
Benjamin believes that this line of criticism fails to take 
account of the impact of the Act on recognition battles as an 
area of dispute. The recognition battles of the 70's and 80's 
were most often disputes over basic rights like access by 
union officials to company premises, stop order facilities and 
the recognition of shopstewards. These rights were usually 
only won following protracted disputes, much like the SPAR 
example, during which both sides sustained needless loss. 
Furthermore, management often used this process to extract ~ 
their pound of flesh ,_ by insisting on the recognition of 
managerial prerogatives, preparing excessively detailed 
dispute procedures and where possible delaying the start of 
wage bargaining. These basic organisational rights will now be 
in the new Act and can be claimed by any union achieving a 
threshold level of membership. The need for the "old style" 
recognition dispute thus falls away. 
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Unfortunately many unions still need to be convinced that they 
will no longer be required to win some form of "recognition 
battle" in order to initiate wage bargaining. 
Despite the fact that trade unions can submit a demand to the 
employer for improved wages and conditions of employment -
they can do this whether or not they have claimed 
organizational rights and regardless of the size of membership 
- the Act's provisions mean that the chanqes of successful 
negotiation will depend upon the employers assessment of the 
union's power; here lies the crux of the matter. 
Unions who have achieved these "new style recognition rights" 
will feel they have nothing more than a hollow shell without 
effective bargaining procedures. Just as recognition battles 
previously were waged over basic organisational rights, the 
emerging unions will now have to focus their attention on the 
bargaining relationship and the material gains that can be 
achieved. 4 0 
Instead of contemplating measures aimed at reconciling the 
hostile and suspicious nature of parties to one another, the 
drafters merely accepted the fact that voluntary co-operation 
was the only viable way forward. In a climate of uncertainty 
the need for institutions which will enforce and uphold 
legitimate industrial practices becomes paramount. By leaving 
the matter to the parties themselves, the drafters have run 
the risk of sabotaging the very foundations of the system they 
hope to exploit. 
4.6 THE COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 
Enter the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (hereafter referred to as the Commission), one of 
the most ambitious but critical elements of the Act. 
40 " Unions on the outside l.ooking in " 
August/September 1995 at 17. 
The Shopsteward. 
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The Commission, so the drafters hope, will play a pivotal role 
in ensuring that the aims and recommendations of the Act are 
carried out. 
Amongst the wide range of functions ascribed to it, the 
Commission must attempt to resolve a vartety of disputes 
through conciliation or arbitration. 
Conciliation, in terms of the Act (sl34) is given a very wide 
meaning. Dispute resolution can be undertaken in a number of 
ways including mediation, fact finding, recommendations or any 
other manner the Commissioner deems appropriate. 
Should conciliation fail the Act provides that disputes of 
certain classes be resolved by arbitration. These awards are 
final and binding, subject only to review on limited grounds 
by the Labour Court. 
It would appear that the Commissioner will be expected to play 
a far more interventionist role in the conciliation of 
disputes than a mediator typically plays at present. 
Allegations of distrust and bias could be further exacerbated 
by the fact that the parties will not have a choice in the 
selection of the Commissioner appointed to hear their 
case.4 1 
The drafters hope that by extending the power of the 
Commission into nearly every area of the Act will encourage 
parties to become accustomed to dispute resolution as an 
effective means of reaching consensus. Furthermore, with 
seasoned professionals available to advice both parties to 
disputes the belief is that industrial action will be 
curtailed and more cooperative relationships established. 
Coupled with an increase in the range of 
4.1 Vs.n Niekerk A " Dispi.1.t ... R&sol.ution, 
current Labour Law l.995 at 43 
justiciable disputes, 
Prac:tic:a and Procedure " :l.rL 
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the absence of an appeal procedure and restrictions placed on 
the parties right to legal representation, is the issue of 
personal. Will the type of labour specialists required to 
effectively staff the Commission be forthcoming? If the 
Commission is to be recognised as a powerhouse of industrial 
expertise, an essential prerequisite to its ultimate success, 
then the role of the Commissioner is of paramount 
importance.42 
If the Commission does not function effectively and enjoy the 
trust of both management and labour, it will suffer all the 
defects of the system it has set out to remedy. 
4.7 THE ACT'S IMPACT ON MARGINALISED INDUSTRY 
THE FARMWORKERS SCENARIO 
The impact of the Act's bargaining provisions on marginalised 
industry is best examined by viewing the plight of the 
farmworkers.43 
It has been suggested that the inclusion of farmworkers under 
a unified labour law holds little comfort for those workers 
who will rely on voluntarism in order to achieve collective 
bargaining. In the new South Africa with it's new Labour 
Relations Act, most farmworkers will remain extremely poor and 
for the most part voiceless at work. 44 
Critics of the Act have voiced their opposition at the 
inability of the drafters to make suitable provision for small 
business. The situation facing farmworkers highlights this 
problem. Firstly, the Act's workplace forums will only be a 
42 "Dispute Resol.ution" in Employment Law. September- 1995. Vol. 12 
N 1 
43 The variety o:f pr-ob1ems :facins farmwor-ktar-s r-equir·as a 
more detailed ana1ysis then is offer-ad hare. Navar-thalass the impact of the 
Act-s bar-sainins provisions war-rant a brief excursion into this area. 
44 Op cit note 32 
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viable option in some 76 farms countrywide; that out of a 
total of some 62000. To expect small businesspeople to show 
enthusiasm for joint discussion would be naive: to expect 
small businesspeople who are geographically isolated to 
somehow show more enthusiasm for voluntary negotiation and co-
determination than their reluctant urban counterparts would be 
\ preposterous. 
The same holds true for collective bargaining. Even with 
greater organizational rights available to them through 
statute, and the right to strike without the fear of 
dismissal, these groups of workers will not be able to force 
their employers to bargain with them. 
If the intention of the Act is to encourage collective 
bargaining by facilitating the capacities of the potential 
collective bargaining partners to bargain, then what is needed 
is the introduction of legislation that extends theoretical 
collective bargaining rights under the conditions obtaining in 
agriculture, to real rights. 
In other words, the absence 
facilitate collective 
compensation. If this is 
in agriculture of conditions which 
bargaining requires legislative 
not done, rights which can be 
utilised by workers in other sectors of the economy will 
continue to be rights in theory rather than in practice for 
the vast majority of workers in agriculture. 
Despite the very real benefits of a legislated duty to bargain 
in the farming sector, the Act cannot be expected to perform 
functions that a1'e probably beyond the capacity of any labour 
system. Many urban, industrial unions will run into 
recalcitrant employers with little or no chance of 
collective bargaining agreements. Some might argue 
exclusion of these smaller business's from the 
arena is necessary for productivity to continue 






Murphy suggests that the problem farmworkers must overcome 
first is organisation. Factors like the great dispersion of 
farmworkers, the extraordinary high rate of casual employees 
and the lack of a favourable legislative environment, makes 
any attempt at unionisation extremely difficult. In order to 
be successful a farmworkers union will need a base of at least 
some 10000 workers. These workers will have to be located in a 
central district and at present only 18 out of a possible 90 
districts could be considered viable options to fulfil that 
role. Adding to the equation the need for skilled and 
committed organisers and the problems are further compounded. 
There is already a shortage of staff in the industrially-based 
urban union environment, and there is every reason to 
that the workload confronting the rural organisers will 





One possible result is that younger, less experienced 
organisers might be forced into representing workers who for 
the first time will be attempting to make headway against a 
largely uncooperative body of employers. Whether such 
organisers could successfully mobilise from a low base with 
sufficient dynamism and momentum to establish a stable and 
loyal constituency in anything more than the short term is 
questionable. 
Without any real industrial experience 





chances of parties being mature enough to handle themselves in 
the manner the Act deems a necessity, are slim. 
In response to this Benjamin suggests that when debating the 
duty to bargain it is imperative to separate the role of the 
trade union movement from that of Labour Law in achieving 
collective bargaining. The trade union movement has been 
45 Murphy M " South A:frican farmwor·kes: Is trade union or•g.anisation 
possibJ.e•? " South African Labour Bulletin. July 1995 Vol l.9. No 3. a-e 24 
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unsuccessful in organising many groups of employers most 
notably those in small enterprises, farmworkers and 
particularly domestic workers. 
It has been suggested that improvements in the lives of these 
workers is more likely to result from the extension of a 
modernised Wage Act and the stricter enforcement of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act. 
However, whether this will help farmworkers remains to be 
seen. The SAAU has been advised by the Zimbabwean commercial 
farmers that President Mugabe's minimum wage legislation was" 
the best thing that ever happened to them A very low 
minimum, which was not revised regularly worked to the 
positive advantage of farmers in Zimbabwe. 4 6 
Other options include persuading the government to adopt 
policies that will encourage farmers and small business 
managers to improve working conditions and negotiate with 
unions; acceptable labour practices could exist as a kind of 
prerequisite for loans and other means of assistance. 
Interestingly enough, for the past year, farmworkers and their 
unions have had the benefit of both the unfair labour practice 
definition and compulsory arbitration in interest disputes to 
win basic rights and improve conditions of employment. It is 
since full use of the easy to conclude from the results that 
opportunities available have been 
approach might be required. 
neglected a different 
The successful organization of these workers will require the 
use of different strategies and types of approaches from those 
that currently serve the industrial, commercial and mining 
industries. Murphy suggests that instead of attempting to 
organise all farmworkers, a Cosatu farmworkers union 
4 6 t1ur-phy M " South African far-mwor-k.er-e: I a tr-a.de union organisation 
possible ? " South African Labour- Bulletin. Vol l.9 No 3 .July 1995. 
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initiative would be better advised to seek to occupy a core 
position within agriculture. A union with a stabilised 
membership of 50 - 60 000 workers, focused primarily on 10'.r~ of 
the permanent workforce located on the farms with over 500 
employees would be in a powerful position to become the 
acknowledged voice of the farmworkers." Rather than trying 
to mobilise on a large, but diffuse scale, Cosatu will 
ultimately serve the interests of the farming community far 
better if successful negotiation and bargaining is seen to be 
taking place. 
Indeed, even if Cosatu could manage large-scale mobilisation 
the chances of achieving meaningful negotiations would be 
slim. Scattered pockets of union resistance would be incapable 
of making any sort of significant achievements. 
The absence of a legislated duty to bargain suggests that any 
extension of rights will have to depend on workers organised 
power, rather than employer generosity or government 
intervention. 
CONCLUSION 
Collective bargaining remains one of the few ways that unions ..../.=-~~~~~--~----------------
q&n ensure that workers living standards are maintained and 
advanced. The non-inclusion of the duty to bargain in the Act 
has introduced a completely new dynamic for the organised 
,:•------------------------···- ---
working class. The losers are likely to be isolated employees, 
workers in small and medium enterprises and those unions 
-~-'=--'<-<----=--• ~----·. .... -,.<,•----== _._. ·------=-,-,-,. __.. .. 
trying to make headway against powerful and recalcitrant 
=--,.._--.....,-.--,...-=.,.-- r· •,-•••••-•·•••F_____.-, ~•-•, 
employers and the labour judiciary. Anti-union businesses with 
poorly organised work forces will also gain, since the Act _______________ ,_,~---- ·-··-
will assist them in engineering a union-fr·ee environment. 47 
47 Op cit note 1 
5. CENTRALISED BARGAINING 
A REVIEW OF RECENT EVENTS 
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As a pretext to discussing the new bargaining councils and the 
role of centralised bargaining it is necessary to review 
recent events. 
The position adopted by Cosatu 
centralised bargaining) must be 
(the call for compulsory 
climate of uncertainty 
with the ANC. 4 B Since 
seen 
which hovers 
as a re sponsE? to the · 
over their relationship 
the early nineties the question facing 
the trade union movement has been its new role in a democratic 
/ 
South Africa. With the demise of the National\ party 
government, the trade union movement lost its visible enemy 
and with it the need and legitimacy for overt militancy. 49 
The shift in ANC economic policy prompted by the organizations 
like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, together 
with pressure from potential First World investors, spelt 
certain doom for the heavy Socialist rhetoric of the preceding 
years. The new model was to be competitive and pro-investment. 
Into this environment was thrust an anxious labour movement, 
still intent on maintaining a sa~~ in the macro-economic issues 
of the day. With talk of a sell-~ut making the possibility of 
\ I 
a new Workers Party a distinct 'reaTity labour settled for a 
place in the NEF. Despite the renewed assurance from the ANC 
of it's commitment to labour the positions adopted in the 
' final Act (particularly those dealing with collective 
bargaining) point towards a need, primarily for growth and 
competitiveness, before redistribution. Taking into account 
recent industrial events and the nature of the governments 
response, often coming from the very pinnacle of the ANC 
4 8 Ds.spi ta th.;. consensus reached at NEDI.AC. COSATU atil.l. pr·opagatE1s 
compulsory industry bargaining. 
49 von Holdt K " The LR.A agreement Wor-ker victor-y or m:1.serable 
compromise" South Afr:1.can Labour bulletin. Vol 19 no 4. Sept 1995 
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hierarchy 50 labours fears of being pushed out into the 
cold seem justified. 
Cosatu made it·s position clear, it has to be part of the 
restructuring of the economy in order to ensure that attempts 
to increase productivity and competitiveness do not force 
labour into an uneasy compliance. 
order for true reconstruction 
Labour must remain strong in 
to be achieved. The current 
strategy adopted by Cosatu - independence, via pursuit of own 
interest objectives - must be viewed as an attempt to counter 
the inherent threats of corporatism and their lack of faith in 
an ANC government. 
In order to maintain a strong macro-economic position Cosatu 
finds itself forced to opt for as strong a central structure 
as possible; hence the recent country wide mass action on 
compulsory centralised bargaining and the demands for the 
closed shop that followed the initial Bill. The more 
- --------------------
decentralised the bargaining structure the less influence 
C9satu wields, as workplace agreements undermine centralised 
. -- --- ·---- ·-- ---------------------
ones and central power as well.51 
Despite the fact that Cosatu is not the federation it used to 
be, it still constitutes a large proportion of the ANC,s 
voting constituency.52 The presence of a powerful Workers 
Party would only serve to weaken the ANC majority, a matter 
that could be highly significant in the attempt to reach a 
two-third majority. 
For the sake of keeping the," alliance" intact the ANC was 
forced to accommodate Cosatu and the demands it made on 
50 
nur-ses 
sae Tha Cape Times "News 
September 8 1995 
Go back to Work - Mandel.a tel.l.s 
51 Hs.rtfor-d D" Cantral.iaed Bar-gaining under- thr-eat "South Afr-ican 
Labour Bul.l.etin. Vol. 17. N 2. 1.993 
52 Brassey M. Br-s.nd J " Fl.awe s.nd Fantasias - a conceptual. s.nal.ysis 
of the Bil.l." Employment Law. t1a.r-ch l.995. Vol. 11. N 4 
31 
tripartite structures like NEDLAC.- although it would probably 
be unrealistic to have expected any form of wholescale denial 
as has occurred elsewhere in Africa.53 
Cosatu·s initial demands were for compulsory centralised 
bargaining forums, the need for requirements on the extension 
of bargaining agreements thus falls away as all employers 
would be party to an industrial council of sorts. 54 
With Cosatu engaged in country wide mass action to force it·s 
proposals, Labour Minister Mboweni announced government 
sentiment, the extent to which the ANC would compromise.· 
Compulsory centralised bargaining was again emphatically 
rejected. The government had gauged the extent of union power 
and shown how far it was prepared to go. The new proposals 
highlighted the governments policy of promoting centralised 
bargaining whilst at the same time conceding that 
" ... if collective bargaining is more efficient at 
decentralised levels, the decentralisation process must be 
allowed by agreement."55 
Government's primary aim in promoting centralised bargaining 
is to get business and labour to forge consensus on the bigger 
issues facing the economy, it is not aimed at securing sector-
wide agreements on minimum wages and working conditions. 56 
The new position adopted by the government of national unity 
is best illustrated by their response to the wave of strike 
action in the nursing profession. Despite government sympathy 
53 See amongst other. Cron1.n J " Workers party plays into Nat hands 
" The Waekly Mail. Vol 9. N 2. 1993 , Hoffo.'iee F " Work.are party j1.miping 
the gun" The Weakly Ma1.l. July 23 1993 
54 " Cosatu·s stand on the draft L.R.A." The Shopsteward. April/May 
1996 
55 " T:i to· a cle~•er compr·om1.se " The F:inancial Mail. J1.lne 31:L 1995. 
56 Op c1.t note 24 
with the position of nurses, if wage increases were given the 
effect would be destroyed by increased interest rates and 
inflation. 
"We would get ourselves into a negative economic cycle. "57 
Once again government had demonstrated its co1mni tment to 
national economic 
concerns. 
issues rather than individual labour 
5.1 PROBLEMS OF THE PAST AND REASONS FOR CHANGE 
Presumably the problem with the current industrial council 
system is that it suffers from the weakness of it's 
structures being either too rigid or extreme. They operate 
through the a pure all-comers" system or through a pure 
majoritarian system; neither structure is flexible nor wholly 
democratic, since neither adequately represents the inter•ests 
of people in the industry. 
Add to this the problem in the voting structure of the current 
system (it gives minority unions to much power) and the 
manner in which the industrial court has undermined 
centralised bargaining (the court has in the past set it·s 
' 
face against majoritarian decision-making) and what remains is 
a formula which according to the drafters will not accommodate 
the proposed changes.BB 
Sectoral bargaining, the drafting team decided, has a very 
important role to play in our society. According to the Labour 
Ministry, as industries are faced with reduction in tariffs 
and re-entry into the global economy they are going to have to 
change. That change is going to have to be managed. In his 
57 Cs.mer-en B " Stra.1.ght-,1 ae:k.eted d1.;.•1.a1.cna · no longer ae:c:eptabl.a -
Business Report. September 27 l.995 at l.B ... an interview with Al.ec Erwin. 




view industry level bargaining arrangements are particularly 
well suited to assist in the transition and the adjustment 
that will inevitably occur. For this reason industrial 
councils should be given the function of 
on industrial policy for the particular 
level bargaining performs a crucial 
developing proposals 
industries. Industry 
role in the orderly 
transition from a protected and inefficient economy to a 
competitive one. Furthermore, it provides an efficient 
mechanism for the provision of the social wage, particularly 
where there is pressure on the state to provide social 
pensions, medical aid etc. 
5.2 THE ACT AND CENTRALISED BARGAINING 
BARGAINING COUNCILS AND THE EXTENSION OF AGREEMENTS TO NON-
PARTIES 
The Act has made provision for the continuation of industry 
bargaining in the form of bargaining councils. 
The primary function of bargaining councils is to r . 
enforce collective agreements. In the first 
c,ouncil's collective agreement will bind only 




the parties to 
extension of 
ag:reeni.ents to rion=t:.ia.1.--t'les· ···is more s-n7111gently regulated under 
the new Act. They will automatically b~ extended where the -~~- ·--·-- ~~ --~-~-.. 
trade union has more than 50% membership in the industry and 
the --e-mployer .. association . employs ·at'-·- least 50% of the 
··-·-··- ---·--·••--·- -·~---·-
workforce. ( s32 .1) 
Before the agreement can be extended the Act provides for the 
establishment of an independent body to grant exemptions to 
non-parties. The agreement must contain a list of fair 
criteria that promote the primary objectives of the Act, and 
must not discriminate against non-parties.(s32.3e-g) 
The minister can also ~xtend the agreement if the parties to 
the collective agreement are sufficiently representative 
34 
within the registered scope of the bargaining council, and 
he/she believes that the failure to extend the agreement may 
undermine collective bargaining at sectoral level.(s32.5a,b) 
Despite the Act's attempts to bolster the position of small 







this sector remains. Research has shown 
vast majority of exemption applications 
received by industrial councils in the past were granted.59 
The pr·oblem appears to be neither the complexity of exemption 
procedures nor, in other instances the obdurate nature of the 
councils, but rather the unwillingness of employers to go 
through the formality of actually applying. 
If this is the case, then the conventional argument that SMME 
employers are the most seriously prejudiced by industrial 
council agreements needs review. Du Toit feels that workers 
deprived of wage increases, 
benefits on mere application 
party to suffer the most. 
better working 
by: the employer 
The fact that 
conclitions and 
might be the 
the Act makes 
provision for sectoral bargaining without any alternative 
mechanism for enticing reluctant employers to the bargaining 
table, and that the proposed wor·kplace forums will exclude the 
lion's share of the economy 60 gives this argument a 
measure of credibility. 
An alternative proposal has been put 
~ / , Iorwaro. by Baskin s 1 
who, whilst still working on the assumption that flexibility 
5 9 du Toit D " Smal.1 Enterprises. Induatr-ia1 Ra1ations and the RDP " 
Industrial. Law Journal.. Vol. 1.6. part 3 1.996 
60 The proposed workpl.ace for-tuns wil.1. be avail.a.bl.a onl.y: 
in workpl.aces where more than 1.11>0 workers are empl.oyed. Thia excl.udes more 
that 74% of the workforce in sectors that contribute 58% of the GDP. 
whera a majority union requests it establishment. Be,-,,•enty -five p"=<r·cent of 
the economical.1.y active popul.ation do not bel.ong to·unions. The percentage 
of workers who do bel.ong to majority unions in specific workplaces wil.1. be 
much bigger. Taken together. these requirements mean that probably more 
than 90% of workers are excluded. 
61 Baskin J " Cantral.iaad Bargaining and COSATU { National Labour· 
and Economic Davel.opment Institute} 1.994 




frameworks only, and then 
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decentralisation, suggests that 
set basic conditions and broad 
devolve bargaining downwards or 
upwards whenever appropriate. In consequence each such 
agreement would normally include a range of schedules to 
accommodate specific conditions facing particular sections of 
that industry. On this basis the small, medium and micro 
enterprises within each industry could be dealt with by means 
of a special schedule dedicated specifically to it's needs. In 
this scenario provisions for exemptions are viewed as a last 
rather than first resort. 
One of the potential advantages of this system is that workers 
in SMME's could force plant level bargaining via the threat of 
the alternative, industry bargained wage levels. 
The problem is the establishment of these schedules. Who will 
decide on their content and their application? Will small 
business have a say or will Cosatu and it's allies decide the 
matter on their behalf? The basic concern, lack of small 
business representivity is still not adequately addressed. 
Once again it appears to be a case of ~ let the parties adapt 
to a predetermined structure.· 
5.3 STATUTORY BARGAINING COUNCILS 
Following months of dispute and country-wide mass action over 
the issue of compulsory centralised bargaining the Labour 
Ministry was forced to step in and provide the necessary 
breakthrough. The final outcome of the NEDLAC negotiations 
reflect these changes by making provision for statutory 
bargaining councils to be al1,ocated to specific industries. If 
there is no statutory council a trade union or employer 
association with the required membership threshold (or two or 
more unions or employer associations acting jointly) in an 
industry may apply to the CCMA (Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration) to help set up a statutory council. 
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The threshold for launching the application is trade unions 
which have at least 30% of wor-kers or employer associations 
employing at least 30% of workers in an industry. (Cosatu's 
initial demands included a 30% threshold level for 
representation)s2 
The conspicuous absence of collective bargaining from the 
councils three main functions remains a contested issue. 
However, statutory councils can serve as half-way houses to 
bargaining councils and therefore provision is made for their 
constitutions to be adapted to include any of the functions of 
a bargaining council, including the conclusion of collect.ive 
agreements. 63 
Should parties be unable to agree on the establishment of a 
statutor·y council then the minister can do it anyway. ( s41) It 
has been suggested that a council which has such ~n 
inauspicious beginning is unlikely to achieve anything 
meaningful in labour-management relations. 
The idea behind the establishment of these councils is that 
employers will be forced to join, lest their voices go 
unheard. The hope is that this process of indirect compulsion 
will facilitate substantive voluntarism. 
Business S.A's biggest problem with compulsory centralised 
bargaining was the fear that wage battles would dominate 
bargaining commitments. The fact that statutory council 
provisions have made wage negotiations optional and by 
agreement between parties appears to have put business's fears 
in this area to rest. 64 However, the situation is not 
entirely satisfactory. The NEDLAC agreements suggest that if 
62 Op cit note 23 
63 Op Cit Note 1 at 36 
6 4 t1a1al.a J " Labo1..1.r- pact: Win aome, l.ose some " Argue 19 J1..1.l.y 
1996 
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there is a dispute over the agenda or outcome of negotiations 
in the statutory councils, the parties will be able to take 
industrial action, including industrywide industrial action. 
The initial proposals ( 65 ) avoided making mention of this 
recourse to industrial action, indeed, even the Minister in 
his parliamentary speech pointed to a very different route 
that parties to a statutory council should follow if wage 
negotiations failed. This included going to a wage board for 
recommendation and then finally Ministerial determination. In 
this way the department hoped that whilst avoiding compulsory 
centralised bargaining, parties would be enticed to bargain 
rather than to have decisions imposed on them by the state. 
By allowing industrial action in order to compel compliance 
at statutory council level the negotiators at NEDLAC have 
followed the path subscribed to in the Act. The idea must be 
that since only representative unions (30% of workers) will be 
able to force a statutory council there will be no need for 
overt industrial action in order to obtain concessions. Unions 
that are unable to force bargaining would in any event be 
unlikely to force employers to offer the type of improvements 
in wages and working conditions that it·s members require.66 
Those unions that are able to enforce statutory council 
structures are probably going to be sufficiently powerful to 
achieve their goals without the need to resort to industrial 
action to prove it. 
Once again the drafters hope that majoritarianism, combined 
with a new perspective ( New Ethos) on industrial relations 
will make for a more equal labour/business relationship 
whereby the necessity for strike action will be curtailed. 
65 see amongst other·, " Tito-a cl.ever compr·omise " Fl.nancial. t1a11.. 
June 30. 1.995, Davie K " Labour fails to win Mboweni · a support " Bunda:;,• 
Timas. Business Day. ,June 26 1.996 
66 Benjs.m.1.n P " Reforming Labour ... l.aasona from the USA " Soc'.1.th 
African Labour Bull.etin. Vol 1.9. n 2. May 1.995 
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It would seem that like the Act·s collective bargaining 
provisions the proposed statutory council system could lead to 
heightened industrial unrest. 
5.4 CENTRALISED BARGAINING AND THE R.D.P 
THE ADOPTED GERMAN-· MODEL. - CHANCES OF SUCCESS 
Whilst centralised bargaining structures are good fol' the 
political arm of Cosatu their potential economic impact on the 
country remains the subject of much heated debate. 
The German experience is particularly relevant given that the 
_;,._~- ~ ~ .. ~~~- ~- ,._ ---- ~ • -• .,__ w,~ ~ ••--•-, .. .. 
Act is based on an adjusted German model which not only 
~ -- -- -=--..,..• ~- . 
encourages centralised bargaining but also includes the power 
extend collective 
---'---------------of 
the state to agreements to non-
participating, non consenting parties; whilst protecting 
workers striking on matters of collective bargaining from 
dismissal. 67 
The adoption of the German model is in itself controversial. 
Putting aside the substantive critiques, one major difference 
is that Germany has a largely homogeneous society in terms of 
educational levels and cultural values .... " such as respect 
for authority, agreement and co-operation all qualities 
South Africa lacks, with it's rolling mass action, high crime 
rate, school boycotts, hostage dramas and road blocks. " 68 
Basically, South Africa comes out of the starting blocks at a 
,huge disadvantage, given a proposed system that depends for 
it's success on a disciplined pursuit of co-operation. 
How successful is the German system anyway? 
67 Rautenbach F " Send l.abour· back to the. drawing board " We.ekl.y 
t1ail. 9 -1.4 ,:rune l.995 
68 Op cit note 37 
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Briefly, between 1970 and now German unemployment has risen 
from 200000 to 6 million {1-2 million of that being from East 
Germany}. German labour productivity and unit labour _, costs 
(the ratio between productivity and wages) lag behind those of 
America and the Far East. 69 
Whilst Germany has fewer strikes then the United States it 
lacks the growth in both job creation and productivity. 
Rautenbach suggests the answer, "in a nutshell, anv system 
that makes it more expensive to employ people. must expect to 
fewer peopie employed," The purpose of the new labour 
dispensation was to supplement the RDP not subvert it. In a 
..,,......,...-,.,.,..u•~>e•~c•C"•-•- - .. & ..,_.,_ • ·""'" aY--=.-...-..>....-.~~----...-.~ ...... ........, . ...,~ .. C •~• ,,__.,...,~~•• ••• _,.,, -' ~ "'".._...0-7•-,, ••~,..,.,,, ... ..--
country in which the central problem is unemployment the 
-----,;------------------- .. ------------ ··-------- . 
addiction to centralised bargaining structures will lead to 
the unavoidable trade off between the rate at which wages and __ _ ~------ ..... ··-·-·----- - •·· •··-- ••-· ·- -· -· ······ - -·-- ---· -----·- - - .... -·-------- ··•·· 
other _emrlgyment costs increase and the rate at which 
unempl9yment rises . 
. . -- --~·-
The German system of centralised bargaining coupled with the 
huge legal strike threat leads to one of two outcomes: more 
strikes or greater concessions being made by employers in 
order to buy labour peace. The latter 
and is nowhere better illustrated 
metalworkers strike. 
has occurred in Germany 
than in the recent 
German metal workers union, IG Metall, went on strike in 
Bavaria. When they threatened to take the strike countrywide 
nationwide"· 
'·, 
employers started making concessions. Eventually a 
strike was warded off by a series of compromises, including '"-
pay hikes and a shorter work week, resulting in an effective 
wage increase of ten percent being phased in over a year. That 
effectively put pay to the increases in productivity that 
German manufacturers had achieved over the past year. 70 
69 Rautanbach F" Sand Labour back to the drawing board "The 
Weak1y t1a.i1. June 9 1995 
70 Op Cit Note 7-4 
I 
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Results like this unfortunately matter because, by failing to 
reduce unit labour costs while more competitive countries like 
the United states, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore manage to 
do so, Germany has weakened its position as a global 
competitor. The price paid is reflected in the growing 
unemployment figures. @_ost importantly in terms of . this debate 
is the fact that South Africa is much weaker than Germany in 
terms of education 
productivit~? 
and skill levels, co-operation and 
5.5 WAGE BARGAINING - SOLVING OR CREATING PROBLEMS 
In a country in which some 50% of the workforce is unemployed, 
the very existence of the RDP is dependant on optimal economic 
growth from whatever quarter. Cosatu~s initial demands for 
centralised bargaining structures were criticised as being 
unaffordable" 7 :i.. 
The Pl'.'oblems is a simple one. South Africa cannot afford rigid 
wage levels at a time when the lowering of tariff barriers and 
cheaper imports have forced local business into global 
j ~~~petition; a situation made even more acute due to South 
~ica·s lack of expertise in this area. 
I 
I 
1e r·epercussions of such a scenario could actually force 
usiness to shed more workers in order to maintain profit 
I mo.rgins. There is the risk of labour becoming a problem in 
/ terms of efficiency and thereby pricing itself out of the 
I 
market. Le Roux points to the possibility of a return to the 
I capital .intensive policies of the past, 
~~g __ in .more. machinery and cutting_ b'!c<e_k 
with company's 
on jobs. 7 2) 
years postal workers strike a disturbing reminder 
Last 
that 
business might be for·ced to adopt such policies in order to 
remain competitive. 
7 1. " Coastu & centr-alised bar·gaining " The Star-. 5 ,1une 1995 
7 2 l.e Roux R. The Star- 11 ,June 1.995 
University of 
points to the 
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Cape Town professor of economics Brian Kantor 
old South African experience to illustrate the 
very real threat of continued wage bargaining at central 
level.73 
Before 1975 there was a close correlation between the growth 
in the GDP and employment. As the economy grew, jobs were 
created. The relationship broke down in the mid seventies for 
several reasons ... a major factor being the growth in union 
power. From that point , growth in GDP was channelled into 
higher wages instead of more job creation. 
Kantor calculates that if the relationship had not broken down 
there would be 700 000 more jobs in the present economy. The 
problem, he feels, is that unions have acquired a monopoly of 
the supply of labour, creating an artificially high entry 
wage. This has denied new and unskilled entrants the 
opportunity to acquire the skills they need to compete in and 
contribute to the formal sector. If wages were allowed to fall 
to realistic levels the immediate benefits would be to those 
people located in the informal sector with the 
repercussions eventually reaching the existing labour force. 
The fear that increased industrial bargaining will pressure 
employers into making wage concessions which in turn will lead 
to higher unemployment and lack of growth has been criticised. 
Ebrahim Patel, argues that by deregulating the labour market 
and "creating more jobs" a new social problem arises. Lower 
wages will result in a static market with employed workers 
being paid-off to make way for the formerly unemployed. In 
other instances business would merely suspend hiring greater 
workforces and benefit by paying the existing workforce on an 
even lower wage scale. With cheap labour" waiting on the side 
lines" the existing labour force would have no choice but to 
73 Op cit note 40 
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settle with their meagre salaries. 74 In South Africa such an 
approach is only too familiar. It was taken to extremes in the 
apartheid era with it's numerous devices for depressing the 
cost of labour such as the bantustan system, the border areas 
policy and the repression of trade union rights. Hopefully it 
has been buried together with apartheid.75 
Professor John Sender believes the problem lies with the unit 
price of labour and not wage levels. Simplified, unit labour 
costs refer to the ratio of remuneration per worker to output 
per worker. In South Africa wage growth has over periods 
continually exceeded productivity growth causing unit labour 
costs to keep on rising. 76 This development is not only 
harmful for employment growth, but may also have an adverse 
impact on rates of return on invested capital. The decline in 
the inducement to invest will inevitably undermine the long 
term growth potential of the national economy and employment 
growth. 
According to Sender, labour is not being utilised effectively 
enough so that it pays for itself. Labour is not being taught 
the necessary skills to help increase South African 
productivity.{ As will be discussed shortly one of the 
reasons for the lack of, or extension of training is said to 
be increased wage levels which limits the creation of new jobs 
or training facilities} 
For Sender, the solution is to increase labour's output or 





is not singularly 
in turn leads to increased wage 
responsible for the lack of 
74 Pata]. E. Tha Star· 11 June 1995 
75 du Toit D "Sma.J.1 Ent6'rprisa, Industrial. RaJ.a.tiona a.nd the RDP" 
Industrial. 1.aw Journal.. Vol. 16. part 3 1995 
, 76 " Labour· costs and productivity " Annua.1 Economic R€oport 1995 -
South African Rasarva Bank 
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development. Indeed, in his opinion and by comparison to other 
countries, far to many South African workers are underpaid. He 
points to the German situation as providing ample support for 
the co-existence of industry bargained higher wages and 
increased productivity. 
Does the Act provide any assistance in this case? 
What the Act does is to creates a division between the 
struggle over wages and working conditions on the one hand and 
the actual business of producing on the other. It calls the 
first" distributive matters " (workers are allowed to resort 
to industrial action such matters) and hopes that the business 
of production, restructuring and productivity will become 
co-determinate" matters. This separation of the bargaining 
arena into "distributive" (the price of labour power) and 
"productive" (the putting to work of labour power) matters, is 
said to be the mystification which underlies the capitalist 
system. 7 7 
'---------- ~ 
The problem inherent in this approach is that no relation is 
drawn between the price of labour power and the value which 
labour creates. Workers are effectively alienated from their 
product and once they have been hired at an agreed price what 
they produce belongs to the bosses. The result is that workers 
are usually not rewarded for increased production and in many 
instances wages do not reflect the nature or output of work. 
Workers are then forced to try and interrupt this division by 
linking their demands for higher wages either to their ability 
to withdraw from production or to passively resist increases 
in production by working below optimum capacity. 
From the perspective of matching wages to worker productivity 
the structural separation which the Act creates between 
bargaining forums ( whether centralised or plant level ) which 
deal with distributive matters and workplace forums which deal 
7 7 Etkind R " Rights and Power: failings of the new ~bour· Relations 
Act" South Afri.cs.n Labour Bulletin Vol 19~ no 2. 1996 
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with cooperative matters is suspect. 
However, the drafters clearly had other concerns in mind when 
they decided to follow this path. The primary concern, given 
the Act·s adherence to competitiveness and productivity is 
that business be allowed to run itself without unnecessary 
stoppages in the form of industrial disputes. 
~orkers are allowed to strike in support 0f a demand that the 
employer bargain, and the material results of that bargaining. 
However, disputes over dismissals, rights, and agreements will 
all have to settled by third party intervention. Thus, the 
rationale for structural separation is to leave matters of 
"managerial prerogative" firmly in the hands of employers. 
Cosatu had made as one of it·s initial reactions to the Bill 
the call for the deletion of restrictions on strike action in 
the event of disputes of right. 
Only in situations where parties agreed to the use of 
arbitration to resolve a particular dispute should there be 
restrictions on the resort to industrial action. 78 
The old disputes over the extent of employer rights will no 
doubt continue to remain a union priority. 
In Sender·s opinion, a further problem facing development in 
South Africa is the huge pay differential that exists between 
workers and staff/management. The Deputy Minister of Finance, 
Alec Erwin has stressed the need for a complete public service 
overhaul to counter this problem. He notes that," one of the 
real problems with the current structure is the gap between 
the top and bottom where ther·e are too many grades and 
complications." 79 It is necessary to redefine the levels of 
7 8 " cosatu-s stand on the draft L.R.A " The 8hopstewar-d. Apr·il./May 
l.995 The scope of this article prohibits any detail.ad analysis of the Act-s 
strike provisions-suffice it to say that 1.1nion demands aimed .s.t al.lowing 
industrial. action over matter-a of right have bean criticised. South African 
Labour Bul.1.atin Vol. l.9 N 4 Sept 1.995 
79 Camaron B " Straight .1acketed divisions no 1.ongar acceptabl.a 
an interview with Alec Erwin " Business Repoi.~t, Saptambar 27 1995 at 18. 
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the basic system as at present it does very little to promote 
the New Ethos, but rather keeps labour' and management locked 
in strong adversarial positions, based on hierarchical 
superiority. 
By closing the huge pay discrepancies that exist the aim is to 
bring management and ground level workers closer to a new 
working ethos in which both parties have mutual respect for 
one another. 
Despite the fact that South African imports still· vastly 
exceed its exports, Sender believes another factor hindering 
growth is the policy of the Reserve Bank. The high interest 
rate is a primary cause for South Africa's low growth rate. 
5.6 OTHER OPTIONS? 
The Japanese system best represents employee/management 
cooperation and understanding. However, the Japanese system is 
entirely unique. Unlike it's Western counterparts the Japanese 
firms represent a kind of structured family relationship. 
Collective bargaining is performed almost entirely at plant 
level as employer/ee alike recognise the commonality between 
• them_se 
The domination of enterprise unions represents a fundamental 
understanding that matters are better dealt with in-house then 
by large industry-wide agreements. 
Furthermore, the enterprise unions have the option of falling 
back on a statutory duty to bargain should employers be 
reluctant to negotiate. 
Despite 
the fact 
the absence of vast wage gaps 
that issues are dealt with at 
in individual companies 
plant level means that 
80 Ar-ak:1. T " The Japanese model of employee r-epr-esents.t:ion " 
Compar-at:ive Labo"Ll.r- Law ,Journal Vol 16. 199:3 -4 
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pay is commensurate with the type of 
importantly the level at which 
work performed, and more 
the particular company 
operates. Productivity and wage increase are far more easily 
assessed and adjusted then if a industrial agreement was to 
set a minimum condition. Japanese companies that are unable to 
compete directly with their larger competitors are better able 
to increase productivity and wage levels then their 
counterparts in Europe who are forced to adopt industry wide 
agreements that are tailored to the needs of big business. 
Despite vehement union 
institutionalisation of 
recognised as a possible 
Skhosana, concedes that 
always have conflicting 
institutionalised it can 
boxer in a ring. '61 
criticism to the contrary, the 
industrial relations has been 
solution to enhance productivity. 
whilst management and labour will 
ideas, if such conflict is 
work positively ·· much lH:::e a 
In (South Africa) any system in which industry agreements 
cover wage levels the unit price of labour is going to be 
artificially high. This is because productivity in small 
business can never keep up with the minimum wage levels set 
for an industry by big union, big business compromises. If 
small business's are unable to obtain exemptions from such 
agreements (the Nedlac agreements do little to help in this 
regard) then the only option left is to employ fewer people or 
close down altogether; neither of which the South African 
economy is able to afford. 
Sender uses the German example to justify his argument. The 
problem is that the German economy is not as structurally 
diverse as South Africa's. This issue is particularly relevant 
given the fact that certain sectors here are vastly superior 
to others. 
8 l. SkhosanE< C':I " W.;. -r-a a.1.1. :l.n th:l.a together· " Entarpr:l.sa. October 
1.996 at 57 
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So whilst across the board wage concessions there are absorbed 
by more uniform productivity the same will not hold true here. 
To draw a distinction between industry bargained wage levels 
and the unit price of labour in the South African context is 
therefore unrealistic. 
) 
5.7 PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
With an ever growing body of support in favour of increased 
competitiveness, it is regrettable that the more militant 
aspects of Cosatu still appear trapped in an outdated 
socialist philosophy. The Witwatersrand regional shopsteward 
council slammed the NEDLAC agreements as being a miserable 
compromise. 82 For them centralised bargaining exists as a 
means of closing the wage gap, alleviating poverty and 
reaching socialism. Some South African unions still continue 
to push a brand of romantic socialism way out of kilter with 
developments internationally. These elements within Cosatu 
tend to show little understanding of the need for flexible 
bargaining. By remaining captive to centralist instincts they 
concentrate on pushing the short term benefit of a relatively 
privileged minority,sa turning a blind eye to any probable 
future consequences. 
As has already been pointed out however, COSATU is pursuing a 
self interest policy which is primarily aimed at keeping the 
federation a macro economic force. The irony of the situation 
is that by vigorously pursuing centralised bargaining COSATU 
could in fact be weakening it's political base. Jobs lost 
during a recession are not easily recreated when the economy 
recovers, and higher unemployment means fewer workers to join 
unions. 
82 von Hol.dt K " The LRA agr-eement ... Wor-ker- vi.ctor·y or- n1i.aer-abl.a 
compr-omi.ae " So .. 1th Afr-ican Labour- Bul.leti.n. Vol l.9 N 4 September 1995 
8 3 " Business and Labour . . . Pr-inci.:ples at atake " Financi.a.l. Mai.1. 
June 23. l.995 
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The constraints that union membership are now placing on the 
economy by forcing centralised bargaining structures has the 
possibility of retarding growth. They will limit the upside of 
the business cycle and its potential to generate higher real 
returns, not just to shareholders but to all stakeholders. By 
reducing the availability of jobs to unskilled workers, the 
existing workforce could become an skilled elite, giving them 
a further competitive edge in the market. Prospective 
unskilled workers will be unable to enter the workforce 
because most employers will not be able to pay unrealistic 
basic wages. If the remuneration of the worker does not 
reflect his/her economic contribution, inflation will erode 
the purchasing power of any increase achieved in wage 
negotiations ... and will induce a recession. 
With unemployment standing at an effective 33%, excluding the 
formal sector, the present growth rate of some 3% is hardly 
sufficient to absorb the growth in the population. 
Furthermore, because South African exports are uncompetitive, 
and will probably remain so for as long as we follow a 
bargaining system that will at best have the kind of effects 
that the German system had on it's competitiveness, our 




the South African 
will .exceed the 
sooner or later 
economy heats up the amount of 
amount of exports. As seems now 
that leads to increased interest 
rates, which does nothing for the export performance of the 
country, but dampens domestic demand. In short, before long, 
our fragile 3% boom will turn into a 0% bust or worse and up 
goes our unemployment. 






The industrial relations structure should reflect the 
diversity/heterogeneity of the South African labour market. 
The decision to adopt the moderated German model was probably 
not a wise one. The wide range of opinions as to the direction 
industrial relations should take clearly illustrates the lack 
of a" shared vision. "At the expense of over simplification 
the vast majority of discontent in the country stems from 
unemployment. The Government has recognised this and committed 
itself to competitiveness and productivity. 
In order to achieve optimal growth all sectors of the economy 
must be allowed to develop, the most important being the small 
and medium business sector. The small business sector employs 
the vast majority of workers and has the potential to create 
an even larger employment base. 85 By encouraging centralised 
bargaining and extending agreements ( particularly wage 
agreements) to non parties the danger exists that small 
business will be unable to absorb unemployed workers due to 
unrealistic minimum wage demands. Even if workers we.re to be 
employed the profit margins in such business's would be 
r reduced to such an extent that growth would be impossible. The 
immediate aim is to create a climate in which business is not 
only profitable, but profitable enough to continue expanding 
and employing the countries workforce. 
85 Nteane s " Sms.J.J. business d61vel.opment and centr·a.J.:1.sed b&r-ga.ini11.g 
"F:1.ns.ncial. Mail. June 6 1996 
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,· 6. CONCLUSION 
The Act's collective bargaining provisions are impressive as a 
proposed labour structure. The question haunting practitioners 
and academics alike is whether our current industrial climate 
is mature enough to adopt the new set of rules. The absolute 
reliance on voluntarism, although well intended, is probably a 
little ambitious. Given the lack of a unity between organised 
labour and business as to the manner in which to transform the 
economy, the very foundations of the new labour law looks to 
be at threat. Without the New Ethos there can be no new 
dispensation. 
The absence of a legally enforceable duty to bargain is in 
line with international developments and the Act's voluntarist 
agenda. Critics of the Act point to the danger of heightened 
industrial action and the demise of smaller unions as possible 
consequences of the new approach. Others feel that the Act's 
advances in increasing or·ganisational r·ights will provide an 
adequate solution for those unions trying to make headway 
against recalcitrant employers. It should be remembered that 
the duty to bargain does not guarantee either effective 
bargaining or agreements. The Act should not be expected to 
perform the sort of miracles that are beyond any labour 
system. 
The success of the Act, s gamble depends for the /nost·--pa,.E_~ on 
the successful implementation of the Commissien as roving, 
interventionist mediator and arbiter, and more imi:,,ortantly the 
willingness of parties to embrace the new order. If the 
Commission does not enjoy the trust of both management and 
labour it will suffer all the defects of the present system 
and none of its laudable objectives will be achieved. - If, ,_ 
the other hand it is embraced then the critics single greates.._~ 
fear is answered. ~ 
Sadly, the evidence presented in this article points to a 
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industrial climate which is hardly conducive to the type of 
environment the Act deems a necessity for the successful 
operation of it's provisions. 
The problems associated with the lack of a bargaining duty are 
similar to those that are expected to plague the new 
bargaining councils. Despite obvious government resistance to 
an open season on across the board wage disputes the issue 
remains whether unions will be willing or mature enough to 
bypass short term gains for long term prosperity. The, 
unfortunate reality of the matter is that without the ability, 
during the short term, to at least get employers to negotiate 
on issues of mutual interest could see more frustrated and 
volatile union behaviour. Just as the reality of the new 
political dispensation is beginning to set in, ( reference is 
made here to the fact that short term benefits have·not really 
been felt by the large proportion of this countries 
disadvantaged peoples ) so to could unions be left very 
frustrated with the apparent lack of any progress. It should 
be stressed that employer and business co-operation on these 
matters is just as, if not more, important than that of their 
union counterparts. A uniform criticism of the Act is that the 
union movement is not mature enough to work within it~s ( the 
Act,s) parameters. What is more important then, is that 
Business acts first to show it's willingness to enter into a 
new relationship with labour. For the transition to work this 
first phase must take place. It is suggested that big business 
is best placed to ensure that this happens. 
The problem again appears to be smaller business/union 
relationships that operate for the most part under a labour 
law all unto their own. Should the Act be the subject of 
criticism for failing to achieve what is probably beyond the 
capabilities of any labour system? 
The argument that small business could be adversely affected 
by industry bargaining is a valid one. Despite the Act's 
52 
attempts to regulate the extention of agreements to non-
parties, via independant exemption boards, past experience 
suggests the need for increased training or rights awareness 
measures to be implemented. 
It should be remembered that statistics point to 
number of exemption applications being granted. 
the vast 
If small 
business was made more aware of the rights they possess then 
perhaps their opposition to industry bargaining would be less 
vociferous. 
The past year has seen labour and business in universal 
disagreement on practically all the major issues in the Act. 
This stance is particularly disturbing for a number of 
reasons. 
Firstly, the bargaining issues over which, the antagonists have 
put up such a fight probably did not warrant that kind of 
industrial action. From a Cosatu point of view the omission of 
the duty to bargain is not that serious. The rna._ior unions will 
not require the duty as existing relationships will continue 
to exist. In the event of employers refusing to negotiate, 
such unions will have the necessary" muscle" to force their 
way. Furthermore workplace forums will be obligatory in large 
establishments and for all purposes they exist as a type of 
mandatory bargaining establishment. 
As far as big business is concerned Cosatu·s call for 
centralised bargaining is nothing new. The Labour Ministry and 
the draft Bill constantly rejected compulsory centralised 
bargaining, so why all the fuss? The new bargaining councils 
are nothing more than an extension of the old industrial 
councils. 
The real problem then is not so much the content of the Act 
but the failure of the major parties to recognise the need for 




The needless conflict that accompanied the drafting and re-
drafting of the bill is an unfortunate reflection on the state 
of South African industrial relations. 
Unions still operate as if they are labouring under the 
apartheid system of old, whilst business is doing very little 
to show a willingness to co-operate under a new political 
order. 
If the Act is to have any chance of success then an essential 
prerequisite is the stabilisation of industrial relations. If 
not, the vision that is the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
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